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The labor force participation rates of older workers have declined dramatically 
in recent years.  The data for men show the trend: 
Year  50-54  55-59  60-64  65 + 
1971  92.8  88.8  74. I  25.5 
1986  88.9  79.0  54.9  17.5 
A great deal of analysis has emphasized the role of Social Security provisions 
in encouraging earlier retirement. Recent examples are Blinder, Gordon and 
Wise  (1980),  Burkhauser  (1980), Hurd  and  Boskin  (1981),  Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1986), Burtless and Moffitt (1984), Burtless (1986), and Hausman 
and Wise (1985). Several of these papers direct attention to the large increases 
in Social Security benefits in the early 1970s. These papers for the most part 
show only a modest effect of these increases on labor force participation rates; 
Hurd and Boskin (1981) is an exception. 
Largely  ignored  have been  firm  pension  plans.  Firm  pension  plans  were 
introduced rapidly beginning in the 1950s. Now about 50 percent of employees 
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are covered by firm plans. The proportion of retiring workers that is covered 
by a firm  pension  has risen rapidly. It increased  from about 4 to 25 percent 
between  1950 and  1980 and is still increasing. About 75 percent of  covered 
employees have defined  benefit  plans.  The benefit under such a plan  is the 
promise by the employer to pay the worker a specified amount at retirement. 
The  amount  is  typically  determined  by  final  salary  and  years  of  firm 
employment. Bulow  (1981) described  pension  wealth  accrual  under  these 
plans, and Lazear (1983) emphasized the potential role of plan provisions  in 
inducing early retirement, as a substitute for mandatory retirement. The very 
substantial incentive effects of these plans have been emphasized most recently 
by Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987, 1989), who summarize the incentives of 
approximately 2,500 plans covered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Level of 
Benefits Survey and consider in great detail the effects of the provisions of a 
large Fortune 500 firm.  This work  demonstrates that  the typical  firm plan 
provides a large reward for remaining with the firm until some age, often the 
early retirement age, and then a substantial inducement to leave the firm, often 
as early as 55. Almost all plans incorporate a large penalty for working past 
age 65. The gain in wage earnings from working an additional year is often 
offset in large part by a loss in the present value of future pension benefits. 
There has been very little analysis of the actual effects of these incentives 
on  retirement,  however.  Exceptions  are  Burkhauser  (1979),  Fields  and 
Mitchell  (1982),  Lazear  (1983), Kotlikoff  and Wise (1987), and  Hogarth 
(1988).  One  reason  for  the  limited  attention  has  been  the  absence  of 
appropriate data. The analysis in this paper is based on the personnel records 
of a large Fortune 500 firm. The firm pension plan was described in detail by 
Kotlikoff and Wise (1987), who also related the plan provisions to departure 
rates from the firm. 
The goal of this paper is to quantify the effects of  pension plan provisions 
on departure rates from the firm and, in particular,  to demonstrate the effect 
of potential changes in plan provisions.  A particularly  important component 
of  the  analysis  is  to demonstrate the  relative  effects of  changes in  Social 
Security  versus firm  pension  plan provisions.  The analysis is based on the 
“option value”  model developed  in  Stock and Wise (1988). 
The primary conclusions  are: 
Firm  plans have a much greater effect than Social Security provisions  on 
employee retirement decisions. 
The effect  of  changes in  Social  Security  provisions  that  are  intended  to 
prolong the labor force participation of the elderly, like the planned increase 
in the retirement age, may be offset by the response of firms to the change. 
We begin in section 7.1 with a description of the incentive effects faced by 
workers  in the firm. The description of  the incentive effects is also used to 
motivate  our method  of  analysis. The option  value  model  and  parameter 
estimates are summarized in section 7.2. Simulations of the effect on departure 207  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
rates of changes in firm pension  plan  and in Social Security provisions are 
discussed in section 7.3. A summary and concluding discussion is provided in 
the last section. 
7.1  The Firm Pension Plan and Retirement Incentives 
The analysis in this paper is based on salesmen who are at least 50 years old 
and have been employed for at least three years.  To understand the effect of 
the pension plan provisions,  consider several figures. Figure 7.1 shows the 
expected future Compensation of a person from our sample who is 50 years old 
and has been employed by the firm for twenty years.* It is important to consider 
total compensation-including  wage earnings, the accrual of pension benefits, 
and  the  accrual  of  Social  Security  benefits.  As  compensation  for  working 
another  year,  the  employee  receives  salary  earnings.  He  also  receives 
compensation in the form of future pension benefits. The annual compensation 
in this form is the change in the present value of future pension benefits, due 
to working an additional year. This accrual is comparable to wage earnings. 
The accrual of  Social Security benefits  may  also be calculated  in a similar 
manner and is also comparable to wage earnings. Figure 7.1 shows the present 
value at age 50  of expected future compensation in all three forms. The line 
labeled  earnings represents cumulated  earnings,  by  age of retirement.3 For 
example, if the person were to retire at age 62, his cumulated earnings between 
age 50  and age 62,  discounted to age 50  dollars, would be about $300,000. 
The slope of the earnings line represents annual earnings discounted to age 50 
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Fig. 7.1  Future compensation of a typical employee 208  James H. Stock/David A. Wise 
dollars. Earnings decline rather slowly through age 60 and much more rapidly 
thereafter. 
The solid  line shows the  present  value of  pension  plus  Social  Security 
benefits,  again  discounted  to age 50  dollars.  The  shape of  this  profile  is 
determined  primarily  by  the  pension  plan  provisions. The most  important 
provisions are described here.4 An employee could leave the firm at age 53, 
for example. If he were to do that, and if he were vested in the firm’s pension 
plan-which  occurs after ten years of service-he  would be entitled to normal 
retirement pension benefits at age 65, based on his years of service and current 
dollar earnings at age 53. He could start to receive benefits as early as age 55, 
the pension  early retirement  age, but  the benefit  amount would  be reduced 
actuarially. If he started to receive benefits at age 55, they would be only 36 
percent of the dollar amount he would receive at age 65. If, however, he were 
to remain in the firm until the early retirement age, the situation would be quite 
different. He would be entitled to normal retirement benefits based on his years 
of service and salary at age 55. But, if he were to start to receive them at age 
55,  the benefits would be reduced less than actuarially, about 3 percent for each 
year that retirement precedes age 65, instead of 6 or 7 percent. In addition, the 
plan has a Social Security offset provision. Pension benefits  are offset by a 
specified amount, depending on the firm estimate of Social Security benefits. 
But if the person takes early retirement, between 55 and 65, the Social Security 
offset is not applied to benefits received before age 65. These two provisions 
create the large discontinuous jump in retirement  benefits at age 55;  there is 
an enormous bonus for remaining with the firm until that age. After age 55, 
however,  the person  who does not  retire forgoes the opportunity of taking 
pension benefits on very advantageous terms-thus  the minimal change in the 
discounted value of benefits between 55 and 60. If  a person has thirty years 
of service at age 60, he is entitled to full normal retirement benefits. No early 
retirement reduction is applied to benefits if they are taken then. That is, by 
continuing to work he will no longer gain from fewer years of early retirement 
reduction, as he did before age 60. Thus, the kink in the profile and the decline 
thereafter. 
The top line shows total compensation. The large jump at 55 reflects the 
early retirement provisions of the pension plan. Total compensation  declines 
modestly each year through age 60 and very rapidly thereafter. After age 62 
or 63, total compensation is close to zero. Under these circumstances, it would 
be surprising if this person were to continue to work until age 65. 
The graph can also be used to motivate the option value model used in the 
subsequent  analysis.  Suppose  that  the  person  depicted  in  figure  7.1  is 
considering whether to retire now, at age 50. If he does, he will receive utility 
indirectly from the retirement  benefits that he will receive until  he dies. (In 
fact, he will not be able to receive firm pension benefits until age 55,  and Social 
Security benefits cannot be taken until age 62.) If he leaves the firm at age 50, 
though, he forgoes the option of retiring at some future age. In this case, there 209  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
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will be a large increase in pension benefits at age 55, and thus a jump in total 
lifetime income, if he postpones retirement until then. Some later age may be 
even more advantageous. In particular,  if he does not retire, he maintains the 
option of  retiring  at the future age that for him yields the highest expected 
utility.  The central feature of  the option value model is that the person will 
postpone retirement at age 50 if, based on his expectations at age 50, the best 
of  the future possibilities  is better than retiring  now.  That is, he postpones 
retirement if the value of the option to retire later exceeds the value of retiring 
today. At each subsequent age, he will make the same comparison. At some 
age, future retirement possibilities will look worse than immediate retirement, 
and he will leave the firm. 
It is clear that the early retirement provisions in this firm are likely to have 
an important effect on retirement decisions. The qualitative effect of changing 
the early retirement age can be seen by comparing figures 7.1 and 7.2. Figure 
7.2 describes  the expectations of the same person considered  in figure 7.1, 
except that the firm early retirement age has been shifted from 55 to 60, with 
all other plan provisions remaining unchanged. It is apparent that the person 
would  under  these  provisions  be  much less  likely  to retire  before  age 60. 
Estimates of the effects of such a change are presented below. 
To  calculate the amounts graphed in figures 7.1 and 7.2, future income is 
discounted at a 5 percent real interest rate and no distinction is made between 
individual  valuation  of  wage  earnings versus  pension  benefits.  To  predict 
retirement, however, the relevant values are not these but rather the discounted 
value of future utilities based on the weights that individuals assign to future 
income streams in determining whether to retire. Such values are estimated in 
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Fig. 7.2  Future compensation with early retirement at 60 instead of  55 210  James H. Stock/David A. Wise 
the subsequent analysis.  As it turns out, the estimated discount rate is much 
higher  than 5 percent, and individuals  value  a dollar of retirement  benefits 
much more than a dollar of wage earnings; a dollar without work is better than 
a dollar with work. Based on our parameter  estimates, the graph, from the 
point of view of the individual, would look like figure 7.3  instead of figure 7.1. 
Based on these valuations  of  future income streams, the person depicted  in 
figure 7.1 would be much more likely to retire before age 60, say, than is in 
fact suggested by figure 7.1. 
Persons of the same age face very different options depending on years of 
service and earnings histories.  A comparison of figures 7.1 and 7.4 demon- 
strates this point. The person  whose  expected future options are shown in 
figure 7.4 has only three years of service when he is 50 years old. He will not 
have thirty years of  service until he is 77. He will not be vested until he is 57. 
Compared to the person in figure 7.1, this person would apparently be much 
less likely to retire before age 65. 
Finally, consider a person who is still working at age 58 in  1980. He has 
eighteen years of  service. His expected future options are shown in figure 7.5. 
Although his wage earnings will decrease only slightly in the next ten years, 
the present value of  retirement benefits will decline almost continuously. The 
graph suggests that retirement would be likely around 63 or 64. It was clear 
from  a  comparison of  figures  7.1  and  7.2 that  changing  the  firm  early 
retirement age from 55 to 60 would have a substantial effect on retirement. The 
potential effect of changes in Social Security provisions can be seen by altering 
the options faced by the person described  in figure 7.5. The current  Social 
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Fig. 7.5  Future compensation from age 58 
are taken before age 65. Suppose that the reduction were 1 percent per month 
instead of  519. The effect on the options faced by the figure 7.5 person are 
shown in figure 7.6. The effect is noticeable, but not extreme. The value of 
retirement benefits before age 65 has been shifted downward, and thus total 
income associated with retirement before age 65 has been shifted downward. 212  James H. StocklDavid A. Wise 
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Fig. 7.6  Future compensation from age 58 with the Social Security early 
retirement reduction at 1 instead of 5/9 percent 
The result would apparently be a lower likelihood of retirement between 62 and 
65, judging by the change in the graph. Actual estimates of the effect of such 
a change in Social Security provisions are presented  below. 
7.2  The Option Value Model and Estimation Results 
7.2.1  The Model 
The details  of  the  option  value  model  are  presented  in  Stock and  Wise 
(1988). The key elements of the model are summarized here.5 Assume that the 
value V,(r)  of working from age t to age r - 1 and then retiring can be measured 
by  the  indirect  utility  from  future  earnings  and  retirement  benefits.  It  is 
described by 
*-I  F 
s=r  s=r 
If  the person continues to work, his wage earnings in year s  are given by Y, 
and the indirect utility from these earnings by U,(Ys).  The weight assigned to 
future utility, in the determination of the retirement decision, is (3.  If he retires 
in year r, he will receive retirement benefits B,(r)  in subsequent years s,  which 
he values according to the function Ur[Bs(r)].  As explained above, a person’s 
retirement benefits will depend on his age and years of service at the time of 
retirement r as well as on his earnings history-thus  the notation indicating that 213  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
B, is a function of r. (We adopt the convention that, if s  is the first calendar 
year during which the person  has no wage earnings, he is assumed to have 
retired at the age that he was on 1 January of  year s.) 
Thus E,V,(r) is the expected value  at  age t  from  working  through  age 
r - 1 and retiring at age r, and E,V,(t) is the expected value associated with 
current retirement. Suppose that r*  is the value of r that maximizes ErVt(r).  The 
person postpones retirement at age t if G,(r*)>O.  That is, the decision rule that 
we assume is: Postpone retirement  if 
If G,(r*)  < 0, the person retires at age t. Thus G,(r)  is the retirement decision 
function. 
Following  Stock and Wise (1988), the  two indirect  utility  functions are 
specified as 
where w,  and 5, are individual-specific random effects. The parameter k is to 
recognize  the possibility  that a dollar with leisure-while  retired-is  better 
than a dollar that is only had together with work. The random terms reflect a 
variety of  unobserved  differences among individuals.  The values that  indi- 
viduals  attach to wage and pension  income may differ.  Some persons  may 
enjoy work more than others; some may enjoy retirement  more than others. 
Both may be affected by health status, for example. Retirement decisions are 
likely to be affected by assets, other than pension wealth, which we do not 
measure. Such differences will be reflected in different values of 6.  In addition, 
we consider retirement to be the alternative to continued employment with the 
firm. For some, especially the younger persons in the sample, the alternative 
may well be another job. The utility of the alternative to work in such cases 
will presumably be greater than the utility represented by U,(B,)  for the typical 
person. These differences too will be reflected in different values of  5. (The 
heteroskedastic error structure that the model implies, as explained below, is 
well suited to capture the effects of alternatives other than retirement, with the 
likelihood of such an alternative greatest for younger employees.) 
Differences in preferences for work versus retirement, differences in health 
status, and other individual differences are likely to persist. Thus, these terms 
are assumed to follow a random walk over time. That is, 214  James H. Stock/David A. Wise 
We  adopt the convention  that at time s the individual knows o,  and 6,  ;  his 
forecasts of  future o  and 6 are based on (5). The random walk assumption 
means, for example, that, if a person’s health status worsens between periods 
t and t  +  1, his expected health status in period t + 2 is not what it was in 
period t but rather what it was in period t +  1. 
As shown in Stock and Wise (1988), with the substitution of the specifi- 
cations (3) and (4), G,(r)  may be decomposed into two terms, one depending 
on the individual-specific random terms o,  and 5,  ,  the other depending only 
on forecasts of  measured  variables.  They are given by 
and 
where ut = (or -  &),  K, = C&fPs-~.rr(sIt),  and ~(slt)  denotes the probability 
that the person will be alive in years, given that he is alive in year t.  The further 
r is in the future, the larger is Kf(r).  That is, the more distant the potential 
retirement age, the greater the uncertainty about it. This yields a heteroske- 
dastic disturbance term. 
In short, G,(r)  may be written simply as 
The probability of retirement is easily described using this expression. If rt 
is  the  r  that  yields  the  maximum  value  of  gf(r)/Kr(r),  the  probability  of 
retirement becomes 
(8)  €?[retire  in year t] = Pr[g,(rt)/K,(r+)  < -v,]. 
To  predict  whether  a person  in the sample in year t - 1 retires  in year t, 
equation  (8) is all  that  is needed.  Finally,  we assume that  uf  is  normally 
distributed  with  variance  at.  The parameters  to be estimated  are y,  k, r 
(where P = l/[l  + r]),  and IT,,. 
In fact, we  are able to follow persons  in the sample for five consecutive 
years. The analysis in this paper, however, is based only on data for one year. 
Retirement probabilities for several years may be derived as a simple extension 
of (8);  they are shown in Stock and Wise (1988), together with estimates based 
on several consecutive years for each person.6 215  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
7.2.2  Parameter Estimates 
Evaluation  of  gJr)/Kr(r)  requires  estimates  of  future earnings.  Individual 
forecasts are based on a second-order autoregression that recognizes individual 
differences in earnings potential and accounts for past evidence of earnings 
increases.  The autoregression  was  estimated  using  the  individual  earnings 
histories of all salesmen employed at least three years, with earnings converted 
to  1980 dollars  using  the  Consumer Price  Index.  The parameters  of  the 
forecasting model depend on age, years of service, and an interaction term. 
The option value model parameter estimates (and standard errors) are’ 
Y  k  P  a,(  x  lo5)  9 
,632  1.2s  .781  ,099  -506.86 
(.OM)  (.28)  (.121)  (.018) 
All the parameters are measured quite precisely,  with the possible exception 
of  the  weight  p. The estimated  y  of  ,632 means  that  the  utility  function 
exhibits modest risk aversion. The estimated value of k means that a dollar 
without work is worth 1.25 times a dollar gotten by working. In other words, 
the typical person would be willing to exchange a dollar with work for eighty 
cents  without  work.  This  suggests,  loosely  interpreted,  that  retirement 
benefits  that  replaced  80 percent  of  wage  earnings  would  make  a  person 
indifferent  between  work  and  retirement.  In  the  retirement  decision,  the 
estimated weight given to income one year in the future versus now is .781; 
income five years hence is given about half as much weight as income today. 
The variance term u,,, $9,900, should be interpreted relative to the present 
value of  future  income.  Typical  values are indicated  by  the  graphs  at the 
beginning of the paper. 
In general, the model fits the data well. Actual versus predicted retirement 
rates are shown in table 7.1 and in figure 7.7. As discussed in Stock and Wise 
(1988),  the  simulated average retirement rates by  age are typically  not  sig- 
nificantly different from the sample averages. The only exceptions are at ages 
62 and 65. There is apparently a “customary  retirement age” effect that is not 
captured  by  the  model. Unlike  other  models  of  retirement,  age enters  the 
option value model only indirectly-through  the  survival probabilities,  the 
earnings forecasts, and the firm pension plan and Social Security rules. 
The proportion of those in the firm at age 50 that would remain at age 54, 
based on actual retirement rates, is .179; the predicted proportion is .190. This 
suggests that, even though measured variables may often not evaluate correctly 
the alternative to continued work in the firm for younger employees, the error 
specification allows enough flexibility that the model predictions are still quite 
accurate.  At  older ages,  the  model  predicts  quite  well  the  proportion  of 
employees who have left the firm, as shown in figure 7.7.8 216  James H. Stock/David A. Wise 
Table 7.1  Predicted and Actual Retirement Rates by  Age for 1980' 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
Number of 







































































































"The retirement rates were computed for the 1,500 persons used to estimate the model. 
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Fig. 7.7  Actual versus predicted cumulative departure rates 217  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
7.3  Simulations of the Effects of Changes in Pension and 
Social Security Provisions 
We have used the model to simulate the effect of several potential changes 
in the firm pension plan and in Social Security provisions.  We  conclude that 
potential  changes  in  the  firm  pension  plan  have  a  much  greater  effect  on 
retirement  rates  than  changes in  Social  Security  rules.  Four  changes  are 
considered. 
7.3.1  Increase the Firm Early Retirement Age from 55 to 60 
The effect of  increasing  the  firm’s  early  retirement  age from 55 to 60, 
leaving other provisions as they were, is shown in table 7.2 and is graphed in 
figure 7.8. Under the current plan, 64.5 percent of those employed at 50 have 
left by 59. Only 42 percent would have left by age 59 if  early retirement had 
been at 60 instead of 55. Only 13.6 percent of employees leave between 55 
and 59 if early retirement is at 60, whereas 45.5 percent leave between these 
ages under the current system. On the other hand, because the early retirement 
“bonus”  is now farther in the future, more employees leave the firm between 
50 and 54. This is the result of the greater weight given to current versus future 
income. In short, many more workers would be employed between the ages 
of 57 and 65 if  the early retirement age were 60 instead of 55. 
Table 7.2  Simulation: Increase the Firm Early Retirement Age from 55 to 60 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
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”For persons employed at age 60 and older, the simulated alternative is the same as the base case. 218  James H. StocklDavid A. Wise 
Fig. 7.8  Simulation: increase firm early retirement age from 55 to 60 
7.3.2  Increase the Social Security Early Retirement Reduction Factor 
The current Social Security rules include a benefit reduction of 5/9 percent 
per month of retirement before age 65. We consider the effect of increasing the 
reduction factor to 1 percent per month. The results are shown in table 7.3 and 
graphically  in  figure 7.9. It  is clear that the effect  of this  change  is small 
relative  to the effect of the change in the firm early retirement age. This is 
primarily because only a small fraction of firm employees are still working at 
age 62, only  14 percent in the base case. The retirement rates of  those still 
employed at age 62, however, are considerably lower-about  29 percent- 
with the higher reduction factor. They are also lower at 63. Still, the net result 
on the employment of persons covered by the firm’s pension plan is negligible. 
7.3.3 
Current plans are to increase the Social Security retirement age from 65 to 
67 by 2027. To judge the effect of such a change on workers with pension plans 
like the  one  in  our firm,  we  simulate  the  effect  of  increasing  the  normal 
retirement age from 65 to 66 and the early retirement age from 62 to 63. The 
results are in table 7.4 and in figure 7.10. Again, the effect on the retirement 
rates of persons in our firm is small. This is true even though the effect on the 
annual retirement rates of 62- and 65-year-olds is substantial. The retirement 
rate of 62-year-olds is reduced from 33.9 to 25.2 percent.  The rate at 65 is 
reduced from 28.6 to 25.1. But only a few workers remain in the firm to be 
affected by these changes. 
Increase the Social Security Retirement Ages by One Year 219  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
Table 7.3  Simulation: Increase of Social Security Early Retirement 
Reduction Factor 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
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Fig. 7.9  Simulation: increase Social Security early retirement reduction 
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Table 7.4  Simulation: Increase the Social Security Retirement Age by 
One Year 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 




















































.  000 
,000 





-  ,001 
-  ,001 
-  .002 
-  ,001 
-  ,001 
-  ,087 
-  ,010 
-  ,016 







































-  ,001 
-  .001 
-  ,001 
,000 
~  ,001 
-  ,002 
-  ,002 
-  ,003 
-  ,002 
-  ,020 
-  ,014 
~  ,010 
-  ,010 
-  ,007 
50  52  54  56  58  60  62  64  66 
AGE 
Fig. 7.10  Simulation: increase Social Security retirement ages by one year 221  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
7.3.4,  Increase Social Security Retirement Ages by One Year and Start 
the Social Security Offset at 66 
If  the Social Security retirement age were increased to 66, the firm might 
be expected to begin the Social Security offset at 66 instead of 65. Thus, we 
have simulated the effect of increasing the Social Security retirement ages by 
one year and beginning the Social Security offset to the firm pension benefits 
at 66 instead of 65. The result is reported in table 7.5 and shown graphically 
in figure 7.11. Increasing the Social Security retirement ages reduced retire- 
ment rates by  a small amount, as shown in table 7.4. But even these small 
effects effects would essentially be counteracted if the firm were to respond by 
delaying the imposition of the Social Security offset. For example, increasing 
the Social Security retirement ages reduced the retirement rate at age 62 by 
.087; the reduction is only .049 if the Social Security action is accompanied 
by  the firm response that we have simulated. 
7.4  Summary and Concluding Comments 
The option value model developed in Stock and Wise (1988) has been used 
to simulate the effects on retirement of  changes in a firm’s pension plan and 
of  changes  in  Social  Security  rules.  Several  important  conclusions  are 
supported by  the analysis. 
Table 7.5  Simulation: Increase Social Security Retirement Ages by  One Year 
and Start the Social Security Offset at 66 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
Age  Base  Simulation  Difference  Base  Simulation  Difference 
50  ,057  ,057  .0oo  ,057  ,057  ,000 
51  ,052  .052  .Ooo  .lo5  ,105  ,000 
52  .046  ,046  .0oo  .146  ,146  ,000 
53  ,031  ,031  ,000  ,173  ,173  ,000 
54  ,020  ,020  .OoO  ,190  ,189  -  ,001 
55  ,119  ,120  ,001  .286  ,287  .001 
56  .I29  .131  ,002  ,378  ,380  ,002 
57  ,160  ,160  .000  ,478  .479  ,001 
58  ,156  ,155  -  ,001  .560  ,560  .000 
59  ,194  .192  -  ,002  ,645  ,644  -  ,001 
60  ,207  ,206  -  ,001  ,719  ,718  ~  ,001 
61  ,247  ,246  -  .001  ,788  ,787  -  ,001 
62  ,339  .290  -  ,049  ,860  ,849  -  ,011 
63  ,365  ,370  ,005  .911  ,905  -  ,006 
64  ,385  ,369  ~  ,016  .945  ,940  -  ,005 
65  ,286  ,295  ,009  ,961  ,958  -  ,003 
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The provisions of the firm's pension plan have a much greater effect than Social 
Security regulations on the retirement decisions of the firm's employees. 
Increasing the firm's early retirement age from 55 to 60, for example, would 
reduce by almost 35 percent, from .645 to .422, the fraction of employees 
that is retired by age 60. 
The effect of changes in Social Security rules, on the other hand, would be 
small. Raising the Social Security retirement ages by one year, for example, 
has very little effect on employee retirement rates. The proportion retired by 
age 62 is reduced by only about 3 percent. 
Changes  in  Social  Security  provisions  that  would  otherwise  encourage 
workers to continue working can easily be offset by countervailing changes 
in the provisions of the firm's  pension plan. Firm responses,  like delaying 
the Social Security offset to correspond to a later Social Security retirement 
age, may simply be a logical revision of current firm plan provisions. 
Thus, in considering the effect of  changes in Social Security rules,  like the 
retirement age, it is important to understand the implications of private pension 
plan provisions. In particular, if the effect on retirement decisions of changes 
in Social Security rules is to be predicted,  the potential response of firms to 
the changes cannot be ignored. 
Although the analysis is based on the retirement experience in a single large 
firm, the firm's pension plan is typical of defined benefit plans. Approximately 
75 percent of the employees who are covered by a firm pension have defined 
benefit plans. Thus, the results suggest that pension plans in general have had 
a very substantial effect on the labor force participation rates of older workers. 223  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
In addition to the simulations, the paper describes the option value model 
of  retirement. Comparisons of  actual versus predicted retirement rates dem- 
onstrate that the model predicts complicated retirement patterns with consid- 
erable precision.  That the model fits observed data well increases our confi- 
dence in the simulated results. 
Notes 
1.  The criterion that they be employed three years facilitates the forecasting of future 
wage earnings on an individual basis. We plan in later work to consider other employee 
groups. 
2.  For  convenience,  the  graphs  assume  a 5 percent  real  discount  rate  and  zero 
inflation. In the empirical model that is estimated, the discount rate is estimated, and 
the inflation rate is assumed to be 5 percent. 
3. Departure from the firm would be a more accurate description than retirement 
because for some employees the alternative to  continued employment at the firm is 
likely to be another job rather than retirement. 
4. Full details of the plan provisions are presented in Kotlikoff and Wise (1987). 
5. Antecedents for the model begin with Lazear and Moore (1988), who argue that 
the  option value  of  postponing  retirement  is the appropriate  variable to  enter  in  a 
regression equation explaining retirement. Indeed, it was their work, and analysis of 
military retirement rates by Phillips and Wise (1987), that motivated us to pursue this 
approach.  Our model is also close in spirit to the much more complicated dynamic 
programming model of Rust (1989). A dynamic programming model of  employment 
behavior has also been proposed by  Berkovec and Stem (1988). 
6. The estimates  based  on several  years  are very  close  to those  reported  here. 
Implementation using two or more consecutive years is only slightly more complicated 
than  the  exposition  here,  with  u,  =  us_, +  E,  , E,~  i.i.d.  N(0, a:),  u,  i.i.d.  N 
(0, ut),  where v,  and E,  ,  s  = t  +  1,  . . . ,  S are independent. The covariance between 
vT  and vT+  , is var(v,), and the variance of  u, for T 2 t is u:  + (7 -  t)u;.  (See Stock 
and Wise  1988.) 
7. The estimates were obtained by maximum likelihood, using 1,500 observations. 
For more detail, see Stock and Wise (1988). 
8. Further details on the model fit are presented in Stock and Wise (1988). 
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Comment  Edward P.  Lazear 
This is a very good paper. The model is sound, the estimates are reasonable, 
and the results are enlightening. Of  course, every discussant must find some 
Edward P.  Lazear  is  Isidore  Brown  and  Gladys J.  Brown  Professor  of  Urban  and  Labor 
Economics at the University of Chicago Graduate School of  Business and a senior fellow at the 
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things to point out, and I have managed to collect a few; but, before doing that, 
I  would  like  to  start with  a  more  general  discussion  of  the option  value 
approach that is used in this paper to model retirement. 
The primary  virtue of  the option  value  approach that  was  introduced  in 
Lazear and Moore (1988) is that it recognizes that turnover at a point in time 
depends on future considerations  as well  as current  ones. A  standard  spot 
market labor supply analysis cannot take into account the effect of work today 
on future pension accumulation without a great deal of modification. Ignoring 
these life-cycle considerations  leads to grossly inappropriate conclusions.  In 
order to see this, consider an example from the U.S. military. The armed forces 
have pensions that cliff vest at twenty years of service. Workers who leave the 
service at any time before twenty years receive nothing, and those who leave 
at twenty  years  or after receive  a significant pension. This means that  the 
pension value as a function of years of service is as shown in figure 7C. 1. (The 
function  drawn in  figure 7C.I  assumes for simplicity  that  soldiers  are not 
permitted to stay beyond twenty years of service.) 
Figure 7C. 1 implies that pension accruals defined as 
V(t)  = P(t) -  P(t - 1) 
have exactly the same shape as the pension value.  That is, accruals are zero 
until year 20, and then in year 20 the full pension is accrued. Consider the 
distribution of turnover within the military. It is likely to look something like 
figure 7C.2. 
Suppose that we took the individuals who left the military  at some point 
before the twentieth year of service. Suppose further that we hypothesize that 
pensions  affect turnover  in the military because of  the extreme cliff-vesting 
nature  of  the  pension  accrual  formula.  The dependent variable  would  be 
turnover rates, whereas the independent variable might be the pension value 
20  Years of Service 
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Fig. 7C.2 
itself as a function of years of service or the accrual in a particular year as a 
function of years of  service.  But for years 0-19,  both P(t)  and V(t)  are zero 
and do not vary over those nineteen years. The turnover rate, on the other hand, 
declines for the most part throughout the period. Thus, a regression of turnover 
rates  on  either  version  of  an  independent  variable  would  not  yield  the 
conclusion that pensions affect turnover. Yet merely eyeballing the graphs in 
figure 7C.  1 and figure 7C.2 makes clear that virtually no soldiers leave in the 
eighteenth  and nineteenth  years  of  service because  hanging  on for another 
couple of  years will result in a very large pension value. 
The reason that we are led astray is that the measure of  pension accrual is 
inappropriate.  It takes as relevant the change in pension  amount associated 
with a given year of service, without being forward looking. What is being 
ignored is that serving, say, the eighteenth year gives the soldier the option to 
retire in the nineteenth year and take the pension associated with nineteen years 
of  service or to go on  to serve the twentieth  year  and to take  the pension 
associated  with the twentieth  year.  Thus, the relevant  variable  for pension 
accrual should be 
V*(t)  = M(t) - [P(t - 1)](1 -  r), 
where r is the discount rate and 
M(t)  = max{P(tJ,  M(t + l)/l + r] 
is defined recursively with M(20J = P(20). 
The definition of V*(t)  takes into account that the individual need not accept 
the pension associated with year t but instead can serve additional years and 
enjoy the pension associated with longer years of service. In the case of  the 
military, the function V*(t)  is shown in figure 7C.3. A regression of turnover 
rates  against  V*(t)  for soldiers  who leave  at  some time  between  zero and 227  The Pension Inducement to Retire 
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nineteen years will give an excellent fit because V*(t)  takes into account that 
work in the eighteenth year is valuable by bringing the worker close to work 
during the twentieth year. 
This approach has major advantages over other labor supply models that are 
designed  to  deal  with  retirement.  The  most  common  alternative  is  the 
work-leisure analysis with a kinked budget constraint. The work-leisure model 
is fine as far as it goes, but it falls short in a number of dimensions. First, it 
cannot address the timing of work over the life cycle. At best it tells us that 
the worker will take, say, twenty years of leisure, total; but it does not speak 
to the issue of when those years will be taken. Second, it is not easily adapted 
to changes in the pension  formula. Each time there is a small change, the 
analysis  must  be  completely  reworked,  and  budget  constraints  must  be 
redrawn.  The shape of  the P(t)  function  in no way  alters the option value 
analysis. Of course it will change the values associated with V*(t),  but nothing 
need be done beyond that. Third, it is quite difficult to incorporate uncertainty 
into the  work-leisure  approach,  and  trivial  to  do so  in  the  option  value 
approach. All that is necessary is that the pension values are weighted by either 
exogenous or endogenous probabilities of continued work offers in the relevant 
years. Fourth, the work-leisure approach cannot deal with changes from one 
job  to  another.  Workers  frequently  retire  in  their  mid-50s  and  pick  up 
secondary jobs. Part of those movements may be pension induced, but they are 
virtually impossible to analyze within the work-leisure context. A change in 
the alternative use of time must be parameterized as a change in tastes, which 
is extremely awkward. In the option value approach, one merely compares the 
value of  working  here with the alternative use of time, which  is a straight- 
forward calculation. 
A second alternative model is myopic life-cycle labor supply. The worker 
is assumed to choose work and leisure over the life cycle, taking the agetwage 
relation as exogenous and given. Taken to the extreme, the model would imply 228  James H. Stock/David A. Wise 
that workers should have low participation  in the military during years 0- 19 
and high participation  in year 20. Of course that makes no sense since one 
cannot work the twentieth year without having already worked years 1 -  19. SO 
a myopic model does not build in the forward-looking  aspect of the compen- 
sation profile. 
A third approach is to solve a dynamic programming problem in stochastic 
environments. This is most closely related to the option value approach but is 
computationally  much more difficult.  It essentially  evaluates each potential 
work-leisure decision and selects the best for each worker over the range of 
possibilities.  The option value  approach  is merely  a  simplification of  this, 
recognizing that the relation of one value to another has to bear a particular 
form and that, once retirement in year To is dominated by retirement in year 
T,,  it is unnecessary to consider year To again. 
Still, there is a significant body of  literature where retirement behavior is 
estimated  in  a  spot  labor supply  or kinked  budget  constraint  work-leisure 
model. It is interesting to compare how the Stock-Wise estimates do, relative 
to some of these others. Unfortunately,  Stock and Wise do not do as much 
comparison as I would like to see done, but they do make a convincing case 
that their model fits their data extremely well, and it is difficult to imagine that 
other models  would  come close to this  kind  of  fit.  Some of  their  claims, 
however, are a bit too strong. First, the authors claim that their model does well 
because it beats using only four variables a model that contains seventeen age 
dummies but ignores future income. Perhaps, but the option value approach 
is  not  the  only  way  to  take  economic  variables  into  account.  A  better 
comparison is between  the  option  value  approach  and  the  kinked  budget 
constraint  model,  on the  same data, because the  kinked  budget  constraint 
model also builds in these economic effects. Since the authors emphasize the 
point that the option value model fits the jumps very well, the kinked budget 
constraint model (which also fits jumps) is probably the best benchmark. 
In the same vein, option values are sensitive to changes in pensions, early 
retirement  values,  and  vesting  provisions,  and  this  of  course is the  main 
strength of  the option value  approach. But the  work-leisure  kinked  budget 
constraint model  is also sensitive to these changes. It would be useful to see 
which is more volatile and which fits the data the best. 
Partial retirement and reentry into the labor market were not handled in a 
clean  way  in  this  paper.  Partial  retirement  can  be  incorporated  into  the 
reservation value, but then income and benefits need to be defined as net of 
what is available on the other job. This is especially problematic if the other 
job has a pension or upward-sloping  age earnings profile itself.  Under these 
circumstances, the worker might want to retire early enough to start the other 
job so that vesting can be achieved there. 
It was unclear how the authors allowed illness to affect income in the model. 
The random-walk error structure allows illness to have permanent effects, but 
some mean reversion process may be more appropriate in the health context. 229  The Pension Inducement to  Retire 
The most serious empirical disappointment is that the model misses badly 
on retirement  at  age 65. This  made  me  wonder  whether  there  was  some 
mandatory retirement constraint either explicit or implicit associated with the 
pension plan. Also, timing is particularly important here because old workers 
enjoyed  a wealth  increase as a result of changes in ADEA legislation that 
permitted them to work beyond age 65. 
While the descriptive statistics that Stock and Wise provide are compelling, 
perhaps the kappa measure of prediction should be used to get a better feel for 
how well the model actually does predict retirement ages. Finally, the authors 
talk about policy changes in Social Security, but they treat the Social Security 
changes as having no effects on the rest of the compensation profile. However, 
previous work has taught us that firms and workers will optimize against the 
Social Security and unemployment compensation system in a way that makes 
both  sides better  off. This means that the pension plan  and  the rest of  the 
compensation  profile  will  switch.  For  example,  if  Social  Security  age of 
entitlement rises from age 65 to age 67,  then it will be optimal to induce most 
workers to retire at age 67, and the pension plan should be adjusted to bring 
that about. This could be accomplished by offset provisions that already build 
some of those changes in or by direct changes in the pension accrual formula, 
On the whole, this paper is one of the most successful empirical pieces that 
I have seen in the retirement area, and I hope that more work of its type will 
follow. 
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